SECTIONS 335-349.4 - California Statutes

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

SECTION 335-349.4

335. The periods prescribed for the commencement of actions other
than for the recovery of real property, are as follows:

335.1. Within two years: An action for assault, battery, or injury
to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another.

336. Within five years:
(a) An action for mesne profits of real property.
(b) An action for violation of a restriction, as defined in
Section 784 of the Civil Code. The period prescribed in this
subdivision runs from the time the person seeking to enforce the
restriction discovered or, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered the violation. A failure to
commence an action for violation of a restriction within the period
prescribed in this subdivision does not waive the right to commence
an action for any other violation of the restriction and does not, in
itself, create an implication that the restriction is abandoned,
obsolete, or otherwise unenforceable. This subdivision shall not bar
commencement of an action for violation of a restriction before
January 1, 2001, and until January 1, 2001, any other applicable
statutory or common law limitation shall continue to apply to that
action.

336a. Within six years. 1. An action upon any bonds, notes or
debentures issued by any corporation or pursuant to permit of the
Commissioner of Corporations, or upon any coupons issued with such
bonds, notes or debentures, if such bonds, notes or debentures shall
have been issued to or held by the public.
2. An action upon any mortgage, trust deed or other agreement
pursuant to which such bonds, notes or debentures were issued.
Nothing in this section shall apply to bonds or other evidences of
indebtedness of a public district or corporation.

337. Within four years: 1. An action upon any contract, obligation
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except as
provided in Section 336a of this code; provided, that the time within
which any action for a money judgment for the balance due upon an
obligation for the payment of which a deed of trust or mortgage with
power of sale upon real property or any interest therein was given as
security, following the exercise of the power of sale in such deed
of trust or mortgage, may be brought shall not extend beyond three
months after the time of sale under such deed of trust or mortgage.
2. An action to recover (1) upon a book account whether consisting
of one or more entries; (2) upon an account stated based upon an
account in writing, but the acknowledgment of the account stated need
not be in writing; (3) a balance due upon a mutual, open and current
account, the items of which are in writing; provided, however, that
where an account stated is based upon an account of one item, the
time shall begin to run from the date of said item, and where an
account stated is based upon an account of more than one item, the
time shall begin to run from the date of the last item.
3. An action based upon the rescission of a contract in writing.
The time begins to run from the date upon which the facts that
entitle the aggrieved party to rescind occurred. Where the ground for
rescission is fraud or mistake, the time does not begin to run until
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake. Where the ground for rescission is
misrepresentation under Section 359 of the Insurance Code, the time
does not begin to run until the representation becomes false.

337a. The term "book account" means a detailed statement which
constitutes the principal record of one or more transactions between
a debtor and a creditor arising out of a contract or some fiduciary
relation, and shows the debits and credits in connection therewith,
and against whom and in favor of whom entries are made, is entered in
the regular course of business as conducted by such creditor or
fiduciary, and is kept in a reasonably permanent form and manner and
is (1) in a bound book, or (2) on a sheet or sheets fastened in a
book or to backing but detachable therefrom, or (3) on a card or
cards of a permanent character, or is kept in any other reasonably
permanent form and manner.

337.1. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no action
shall be brought to recover damages from any person performing or
furnishing the design, specifications, surveying, planning,
supervision or observation of construction or construction of an
improvement to real property more than four years after the
substantial completion of such improvement for any of the following:
(1) Any patent deficiency in the design, specifications,
surveying, planning, supervision or observation of construction or
construction of an improvement to, or survey of, real property;
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such
patent deficiency; or
(3) Injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any
such patent deficiency.
(b) If, by reason of such patent deficiency, an injury to property
or the person or an injury causing wrongful death occurs during the
fourth year after such substantial completion, an action in tort to
recover damages for such an injury or wrongful death may be brought
within one year after the date on which such injury occurred,
irrespective of the date of death, but in no event may such an action
be brought more than five years after the substantial completion of
construction of such improvement.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the
period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any
action.
(d) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be
asserted by way of defense by any person in actual possession or the
control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of such an improvement at the
time any deficiency in such an improvement constitutes the proximate
cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to bring an
action.
(e) As used in this section, "patent deficiency" means a
deficiency which is apparent by reasonable inspection.
(f) Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not apply to any owner-occupied
single-unit residence.

337.15. (a) No action may be brought to recover damages from any
person, or the surety of a person, who develops real property or
performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying,
planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction or
construction of an improvement to real property more than 10 years
after the substantial completion of the development or improvement
for any of the following:
(1) Any latent deficiency in the design, specification, surveying,
planning, supervision, or observation of construction or
construction of an improvement to, or survey of, real property.
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such
latent deficiency.
(b) As used in this section, "latent deficiency" means a
deficiency which is not apparent by reasonable inspection.
(c) As used in this section, "action" includes an action for
indemnity brought against a person arising out of that person's
performance or furnishing of services or materials referred to in
this section, except that a cross-complaint for indemnity may be
filed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 428.10 in an action
which has been brought within the time period set forth in
subdivision (a) of this section.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the
period prescribed by the laws of this state for bringing any action.
(e) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be
asserted by way of defense by any person in actual possession or the
control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of such an improvement, at
the time any deficiency in the improvement constitutes the proximate
cause for which it is proposed to bring an action.
(f) This section shall not apply to actions based on willful
misconduct or fraudulent concealment.
(g) The 10-year period specified in subdivision (a) shall commence
upon substantial completion of the improvement, but not later than
the date of one of the following, whichever first occurs:
(1) The date of final inspection by the applicable public agency.
(2) The date of recordation of a valid notice of completion.
(3) The date of use or occupation of the improvement.
(4) One year after termination or cessation of work on the
improvement.
The date of substantial completion shall relate specifically to
the performance or furnishing design, specifications, surveying,
planning, supervision, testing, observation of construction or
construction services by each profession or trade rendering services
to the improvement.

337.2. Where a lease of real property is in writing, no action
shall be brought under Section 1951.2 of the Civil Code more than
four years after the breach of the lease and abandonment of the
property, or more than four years after the termination of the right
of the lessee to possession of the property, whichever is the earlier
time.

337.5. Within 10 years:
(a) An action upon any general obligation bonds or coupons, not
secured in whole or in part by a lien on real property, issued by any
county, city and county, municipal corporation, district (including
school districts), or other political subdivision of the State of
California.
(b) An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United
States or of any state within the United States.

337.6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 337.5 of this code
actions may be brought on bonds or coupons as set forth in
subsection 2 of said section, against which the statute of
limitations ran on or after August 27, 1937; provided, such actions
are brought on or before June 30, 1959. Upon presentation for payment
they shall be registered and payment shall not be made thereon until
the next fiscal year following presentation unless available funds
are sufficient to first pay obligations which are due or will become
due from the same fund during the fiscal year of presentation and
during the next succeeding six months. Interest shall not be paid on
bonds or coupons registered for the purpose of this section.

338. Within three years:
(a) An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a
penalty or forfeiture.
(b) An action for trespass upon or injury to real property.
(c) (1) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring any goods or
chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of personal
property.
(2) The cause of action in the case of theft, as described in
Section 484 of the Penal Code, of any article of historical,
interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance is not deemed to
have accrued until the discovery of the whereabouts of the article by
the aggrieved party, his or her agent, or the law enforcement agency
that originally investigated the theft.
(3) (A) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), an action for the
specific recovery of a work of fine art brought against a museum,
gallery, auctioneer, or dealer, in the case of an unlawful taking or
theft, as described in Section 484 of the Penal Code, of a work of
fine art, including a taking or theft by means of fraud or duress,
shall be commenced within six years of the actual discovery by the
claimant or his or her agent, of both of the following:
(i) The identity and the whereabouts of the work of fine art. In
the case where there is a possibility of misidentification of the
object of fine art in question, the identity can be satisfied by the
identification of facts sufficient to determine that the work of fine
art is likely to be the work of fine art that was unlawfully taken
or stolen.
(ii) Information or facts that are sufficient to indicate that the
claimant has a claim for a possessory interest in the work of fine
art that was unlawfully taken or stolen.
(B) The provisions of this paragraph shall apply to all pending
and future actions commenced on or before December 31, 2017,
including any actions dismissed based on the expiration of statutes
of limitation in effect prior to the date of enactment of this
statute if the judgment in that action is not yet final or if the
time for filing an appeal from a decision on that action has not
expired, provided that the action concerns a work of fine art that
was taken within 100 years prior to the date of enactment of this
statute.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph:
(i) "Actual discovery," notwithstanding Section 19 of the Civil
Code, does not include any constructive knowledge imputed by law.
(ii) "Auctioneer" means any individual who is engaged in, or who
by advertising or otherwise holds himself or herself out as being
available to engage in, the calling for, the recognition of, and the
acceptance of, offers for the purchase of goods at an auction as
defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1812.601 of the Civil Code.
(iii) "Dealer" means a person who holds a valid seller's permit
and who is actively and principally engaged in, or conducting the
business of, selling works of fine art.
(iv) "Duress" means a threat of force, violence, danger, or
retribution against an owner of the work of fine art in question, or
his or her family member, sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of
ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act that otherwise would not
have been performed or to acquiesce to an act to which he or she
would otherwise not have acquiesced.
(v) "Fine art" has the same meaning as defined in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (d) of Section 982 of the Civil Code.
(vi) "Museum or gallery" shall include any public or private
organization or foundation operating as a museum or gallery.
(4) Section 361 shall not apply to an action brought pursuant to
paragraph (3).
(5) A party in an action to which paragraph (3) applies may raise
all equitable and legal affirmative defenses and doctrines,
including, without limitation, laches and unclean hands.
(d) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The
cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake.
(e) An action upon a bond of a public official except any cause of
action based on fraud or embezzlement is not deemed to have accrued
until the discovery, by the aggrieved party or his or her agent, of
the facts constituting the cause of action upon the bond.
(f) (1) An action against a notary public on his or her bond or in
his or her official capacity except that any cause of action based
on malfeasance or misfeasance is not deemed to have accrued until
discovery, by the aggrieved party or his or her agent, of the facts
constituting the cause of action.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an action based on malfeasance
or misfeasance shall be commenced within one year from discovery, by
the aggrieved party or his or her agent, of the facts constituting
the cause of action or within three years from the performance of the
notarial act giving rise to the action, whichever is later.
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an action against a notary
public on his or her bond or in his or her official capacity shall be
commenced within six years.
(g) An action for slander of title to real property.
(h) An action commenced under Section 17536 of the Business and
Professions Code. The cause of action in that case shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party,
the Attorney General, the district attorney, the county counsel, the
city prosecutor, or the city attorney of the facts constituting
grounds for commencing the action.
(i) An action commenced under the Porter-Cologne Water Quality
Control Act (Division 7 (commencing with Section 13000) of the Water
Code). The cause of action in that case shall not be deemed to have
accrued until the discovery by the State Water Resources Control
Board or a regional water quality control board of the facts
constituting grounds for commencing actions under their jurisdiction.
(j) An action to recover for physical damage to private property
under Section 19 of Article I of the California Constitution.
(k) An action commenced under Division 26 (commencing with Section
39000) of the Health and Safety Code. These causes of action shall
not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the State Air
Resources Board or by a district, as defined in Section 39025 of the
Health and Safety Code, of the facts constituting grounds for
commencing the action under its jurisdiction.
(l) An action commenced under Section 1603.1, 1615, or 5650.1 of
the Fish and Game Code. These causes of action shall not be deemed to
have accrued until discovery by the agency bringing the action of
the facts constituting the grounds for commencing the action.
(m) An action challenging the validity of the levy upon a parcel
of a special tax levied by a local agency on a per parcel basis.
(n) An action commencing under Section 51.7 of the Civil Code.

338.1. An action for civil penalties or punitive damages authorized
under Chapter 6.5 (commencing with Section 25100), Chapter 6.7
(commencing with Section 25280), Chapter 6.8 (commencing with Section
25300), or Chapter 6.95 (commencing with Section 25500) of Division
20 of the Health and Safety Code shall be commenced within five years
after the discovery by the agency bringing the action of the facts
constituting the grounds for commencing the action.

339. Within two years: 1. An action upon a contract, obligation or
liability not founded upon an instrument of writing, except as
provided in Section 2725 of the Commercial Code or subdivision 2 of
Section 337 of this code; or an action founded upon a contract,
obligation or liability, evidenced by a certificate, or abstract or
guaranty of title of real property, or by a policy of title
insurance; provided, that the cause of action upon a contract,
obligation or liability evidenced by a certificate, or abstract or
guaranty of title of real property or policy of title insurance shall
not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the loss or
damage suffered by the aggrieved party thereunder.
2. An action against a sheriff or coroner upon a liability
incurred by the doing of an act in an official capacity and in virtue
of office, or by the omission of an official duty including the
nonpayment of money collected in the enforcement of a judgment.
3. An action based upon the rescission of a contract not in
writing. The time begins to run from the date upon which the facts
that entitle the aggrieved party to rescind occurred. Where the
ground for rescission is fraud or mistake, the time does not begin to
run until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.

339.5. Where a lease of real property is not in writing, no action
shall be brought under Section 1951.2 of the Civil Code more than two
years after the breach of the lease and abandonment of the property,
or more than two years after the termination of the right of the
lessee to possession of the property, whichever is the earlier time.

340. Within one year:
(a) An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the
action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state,
except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.
(b) An action upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the
people of this state.
(c) An action for libel, slander, false imprisonment, seduction of
a person below the age of legal consent, or by a depositor against a
bank for the payment of a forged or raised check, or a check that
bears a forged or unauthorized endorsement, or against any person who
boards or feeds an animal or fowl or who engages in the practice of
veterinary medicine as defined in Section 4826 of the Business and
Professions Code, for that person's neglect resulting in injury or
death to an animal or fowl in the course of boarding or feeding the
animal or fowl or in the course of the practice of veterinary
medicine on that animal or fowl.
(d) An action against an officer to recover damages for the
seizure of any property for a statutory forfeiture to the state, or
for the detention of, or injury to property so seized, or for damages
done to any person in making that seizure.
(e) An action by a good faith improver for relief under Chapter 10
(commencing with Section 871.1) of Title 10 of Part 2. The time
begins to run from the date upon which the good faith improver
discovers that the good faith improver is not the owner of the land
upon which the improvements have been made.

340.1. (a) In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a
result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the
action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains
the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff
discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological
injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by
the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later, for any of the
following actions:
(1) An action against any person for committing an act of
childhood sexual abuse.
(2) An action for liability against any person or entity who owed
a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by
that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual
abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3) An action for liability against any person or entity where an
intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the
childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b) (1) No action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision
(a) may be commenced on or after the plaintiff's 26th birthday.
(2) This subdivision does not apply if the person or entity knew
or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful
sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent,
and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable
safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by
that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding
placement of that person in a function or environment in which
contact with children is an inherent part of that function or
environment. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring
counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a
reasonable step or reasonable safeguard.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for
damages described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) that is
permitted to be filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b)
that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because
the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived,
and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one
year of January 1, 2003. Nothing in this subdivision shall be
construed to alter the applicable statute of limitations period of an
action that is not time barred as of January 1, 2003.
(d) Subdivision (c) does not apply to either of the following:
(1) Any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in
any court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2003.
Termination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of
limitations does not constitute a claim that has been litigated to
finality on the merits.
(2) Any written, compromised settlement agreement which has been
entered into between a plaintiff and a defendant where the plaintiff
was represented by an attorney who was admitted to practice law in
this state at the time of the settlement, and the plaintiff signed
the agreement.
(e) "Childhood sexual abuse" as used in this section includes any
act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff
was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by
Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code;
paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of
Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288
of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of
subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h),
(i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the
Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the
time the act was committed. Nothing in this subdivision limits the
availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a),
including causes of action against persons or entities other than the
alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the
otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of
the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to
this section.
(g) Every plaintiff 26 years of age or older at the time the
action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in
subdivision (h).
(h) Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for
the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected
by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth
the facts which support the declaration:
(1) That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, that the
attorney has consulted with at least one mental health practitioner
who is licensed to practice and practices in this state and who the
attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts
and issues involved in the particular action, and that the attorney
has concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there
is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action.
The person consulted may not be a party to the litigation.
(2) That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to
practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the
action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the
plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff
and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the
particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her
knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional
opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had
been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
(3) That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation
required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would
impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs
(1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the
action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the
certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within
60 days after filing the complaint.
(i) Where certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (g),
the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate
of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
(j) In any action subject to subdivision (g), no defendant may be
served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not
attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed
pursuant to subdivision (h) with respect to that defendant, and has
found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that
there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the
action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that
defendant with process shall attach.
(k) A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional
conduct and may be the grounds for discipline against the attorney.
(l) The failure to file certificates in accordance with this
section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or
a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
(m) In any action subject to subdivision (g), no defendant may be
named except by "Doe" designation in any pleadings or papers filed in
the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as
to the charging allegations against that defendant.
(n) At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply
to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the
name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation,
as follows:
(1) The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of
corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The
certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or
more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations
against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and
concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If
the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or
the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the
attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of
the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the
witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For
purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if
it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental
health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a
corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
(2) Where the application to name a defendant is made prior to
that defendant's appearance in the action, neither the application
nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be
served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or
their counsel of record.
(3) Where the application to name a defendant is made after that
defendant's appearance in the action, the application shall be served
on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the
certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served
on any party or their counsel of record.
(o) The court shall review the application and the certificate of
corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and
any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall,
if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging
allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the
complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or
defendants.
(p) The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the
public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff,
any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to
subdivision (n).
(q) Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect
to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for
whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this
section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the court'
s own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the
attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (h) to
execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone
number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to
subdivision (h) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation
of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number
shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of
the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to
comply with this section, the court may order a party, a party's
attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney'
s fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit
should have been filed.
(r) The amendments to this section enacted at the 1990 portion of
the 1989-90 Regular Session shall apply to any action commenced on or
after January 1, 1991, including any action otherwise barred by the
period of limitations in effect prior to January 1, 1991, thereby
reviving those causes of action which had lapsed or technically
expired under the law existing prior to January 1, 1991.
(s) The Legislature declares that it is the intent of the
Legislature, in enacting the amendments to this section enacted at
the 1994 portion of the 1993-94 Regular Session, that the express
language of revival added to this section by those amendments shall
apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991.
(t) Nothing in the amendments to this section enacted at the 1998
portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session is intended to create a new
theory of liability.
(u) The amendments to subdivision (a) of this section, enacted at
the 1998 portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session, shall apply to any
action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, and to any action filed
prior to January 1, 1999, and still pending on that date, including
any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the
laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999. Nothing in this subdivision
is intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there
has been a final adjudication prior to January 1, 1999.

340.15. (a) In any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as
a result of domestic violence, the time for commencement of the
action shall be the later of the following:
(1) Within three years from the date of the last act of domestic
violence by the defendant against the plaintiff.
(2) Within three years from the date the plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered that an injury or illness resulted
from an act of domestic violence by the defendant against the
plaintiff.
(b) As used in this section, "domestic violence" has the same
meaning as defined in Section 6211 of the Family Code.

340.2. (a) In any civil action for injury or illness based upon
exposure to asbestos, the time for the commencement of the action
shall be the later of the following:
(1) Within one year after the date the plaintiff first suffered
disability.
(2) Within one year after the date the plaintiff either knew, or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that
such disability was caused or contributed to by such exposure.
(b) "Disability" as used in subdivision (a) means the loss of time
from work as a result of such exposure which precludes the
performance of the employee's regular occupation.
(c) In an action for the wrongful death of any plaintiff's
decedent, based upon exposure to asbestos, the time for commencement
of an action shall be the later of the following:
(1) Within one year from the date of the death of the plaintiff's
decedent.
(2) Within one year from the date the plaintiff first knew, or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that
the death was caused or contributed to by such exposure.

340.3. (a) Unless a longer period is prescribed for a specific
action, in any action for damages against a defendant based upon the
defendant's commission of a felony offense for which the defendant
has been convicted, the time for commencement of the action shall be
within one year after judgment is pronounced.
(b) (1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), an action for damages
against a defendant based upon the defendant's commission of a felony
offense for which the defendant has been convicted may be commenced
within 10 years of the date on which the defendant is discharged from
parole if the conviction was for any offense specified in paragraph
(1), except voluntary manslaughter, (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(9), (16), (17), (20), (22), (25), (34), or (35) of subdivision (c)
of Section 1192.7 of the Penal Code.
(2) No civil action may be commenced pursuant to paragraph (1) if
any of the following applies:
(A) The defendant has received either a certificate of
rehabilitation as provided in Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section
4852.01) of Title 6 of Part 3 of the Penal Code or a pardon as
provided in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 4800) or Chapter 3
(commencing with Section 4850) of Title 6 of Part 3 of the Penal
Code.
(B) Following a conviction for murder or attempted murder, the
defendant has been paroled based in whole or in part upon evidence
presented to the Board of Prison Terms that the defendant committed
the crime because he or she was the victim of intimate partner
battering.
(C) The defendant was convicted of murder or attempted murder in
the second degree in a trial at which substantial evidence was
presented that the person committed the crime because he or she was a
victim of intimate partner battering.
(c) If the sentence or judgment is stayed, the time for the
commencement of the action shall be tolled until the stay is lifted.
For purposes of this section, a judgment is not stayed if the
judgment is appealed or the defendant is placed on probation.
(d) (1) Subdivision (b) shall apply to any action commenced
before, on, or after the effective date of this section, including
any action otherwise barred by a limitation of time in effect prior
to the effective date of this section, thereby reviving those causes
of action that had lapsed or expired under the law in effect prior to
the effective date of this section.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to either of the following:
(A) Any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in
any court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2003. For
purposes of this section, termination of a prior action on the basis
of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that has
been litigated to finality on the merits.
(B) Any written, compromised settlement agreement that has been
entered into between a plaintiff and a defendant if the plaintiff was
represented by an attorney who was admitted to practice law in this
state at the time of the settlement, and the plaintiff signed the
agreement.
(e) Any restitution paid by the defendant to the victim shall be
credited against any judgment, award, or settlement obtained pursuant
to this section. Any judgment, award, or settlement obtained
pursuant to an action under this section shall be subject to the
provisions of Section 13966.01 of the Government Code.

340.35. (a) This section shall apply if both of the following
conditions are met:
(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed in a
criminal case initiated pursuant to subdivision (f), (g), or (h) of
Section 803 of the Penal Code.
(2) The case was dismissed or overturned pursuant to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Stogner v. California (2003) 156
L.Ed.2d 544.
(b) Unless a longer period is prescribed for a specific action,
any action for damages against an individual for committing an act of
childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced before January 1, 2006.
(c) This section shall apply to any action commenced before, on,
or after the effective date of this section, including any action
otherwise barred by a limitation of time in effect prior to the
effective date of this section, thereby reviving those causes of
action that had lapsed or expired under the law in effect prior to
the effective date of this section.
(d) This section shall not apply to any of the following:
(1) Any claim against a person or entity other than the individual
against whom a complaint, information, or indictment was filed as
described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a).
(2) Any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in
any court of competent jurisdiction prior to the effective date of
this section. For purposes of this section, termination of a prior
action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute
a claim that has been "litigated to finality on the merits."
(3) Any written, compromised settlement agreement that has been
entered into between a plaintiff and a defendant, if the plaintiff
was represented by an attorney who was admitted to practice law in
this state at the time of the settlement, and the plaintiff signed
the agreement.
(e) Any restitution paid by the defendant to the victim shall be
credited against any judgment, award, or settlement obtained pursuant
to this section. Any judgment, award, or settlement obtained
pursuant to an action under this section shall be subject to Section
13966.01 of the Government Code.

340.4. An action by or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries
sustained before or in the course of his or her birth must be
commenced within six years after the date of birth, and the time the
minor is under any disability mentioned in Section 352 shall not be
excluded in computing the time limited for the commencement of the
action.

340.5. In an action for injury or death against a health care
provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence,
the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after
the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
injury, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for
commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled for any
of the following: (1) upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional
concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which has no
therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the
injured person. Actions by a minor shall be commenced within three
years from the date of the alleged wrongful act except that actions
by a minor under the full age of six years shall be commenced within
three years or prior to his eighth birthday whichever provides a
longer period. Such time limitation shall be tolled for minors for
any period during which parent or guardian and defendant's insurer or
health care provider have committed fraud or collusion in the
failure to bring an action on behalf of the injured minor for
professional negligence.
For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Health care provider" means any person licensed or certified
pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) of the Business
and Professions Code, or licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic
Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic Initiative Act, or licensed
pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1440) of Division 2
of the Health and Safety Code; and any clinic, health dispensary, or
health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with
Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code. "Health care provider"
includes the legal representatives of a health care provider;
(2) "Professional negligence" means a negligent act or omission to
act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional
services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal
injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the
scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are
not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or
licensed hospital.

340.6. (a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or
omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of
professional services shall be commenced within one year after the
plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or
omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or
omission, whichever occurs first. If the plaintiff is required to
establish his or her factual innocence for an underlying criminal
charge as an element of his or her claim, the action shall be
commenced within two years after the plaintiff achieves
postconviction exoneration in the form of a final judicial
disposition of the criminal case. Except for a claim for which the
plaintiff is required to establish his or her factual innocence, in
no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed four
years except that the period shall be tolled during the time that any
of the following exist:
(1) The plaintiff has not sustained actual injury.
(2) The attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding
the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or
omission occurred.
(3) The attorney willfully conceals the facts constituting the
wrongful act or omission when such facts are known to the attorney,
except that this subdivision shall toll only the four-year
limitation.
(4) The plaintiff is under a legal or physical disability which
restricts the plaintiff's ability to commence legal action.
(b) In an action based upon an instrument in writing, the
effective date of which depends upon some act or event of the future,
the period of limitations provided for by this section shall
commence to run upon the occurrence of that act or event.

340.7. (a) Notwithstanding Section 335.1, a civil action brought
by, or on behalf of, a Dalkon Shield victim against the Dalkon Shield
Claimants' Trust, shall be brought in accordance with the procedures
established by A.H. Robins Company, Inc. Plan of Reorganization, and
shall be brought within 15 years of the date on which the victim's
injury occurred, except that the statute shall be tolled from August
21, 1985, the date on which the A.H. Robins Company filed for Chapter
11 Reorganization in Richmond, Virginia.
(b) This section applies regardless of when the action or claim
shall have accrued or been filed and regardless of whether it might
have lapsed or otherwise be barred by time under California law.
However, this section shall only apply to victims who, prior to
January 1, 1990, filed a civil action, a timely claim, or a claim
that is declared to be timely under the sixth Amended and Restated
Disclosure Statement filed pursuant to Section 1125 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code in re: A.H. Robins Company, Inc., dated March 28,
1988, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia (case
number 85-01307-R).

340.8. (a) In any civil action for injury or illness based upon
exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance, the time for
commencement of the action shall be no later than either two years
from the date of injury, or two years after the plaintiff becomes
aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, (1) an injury,
(2) the physical cause of the injury, and (3) sufficient facts to put
a reasonable person on inquiry notice that the injury was caused or
contributed to by the wrongful act of another, whichever occurs
later.
(b) In an action for the wrongful death of any plaintiff's
decedent, based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic
substance, the time for commencement of an action shall be no later
than either (1) two years from the date of the death of the plaintiff'
s decedent, or (2) two years from the first date on which the
plaintiff is aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, the
physical cause of the death and sufficient facts to put a reasonable
person on inquiry notice that the death was caused or contributed to
by the wrongful act of another, whichever occurs later.
(c) For purposes of this section:
(1) A "civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a
hazardous material or toxic substance" does not include an action
subject to Section 340.2 or 340.5.
(2) Media reports regarding the hazardous material or toxic
substance contamination do not, in and of themselves, constitute
sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice that
the injury or death was caused or contributed to by the wrongful act
of another.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit, abrogate,
or change the law in effect on the effective date of this section
with respect to actions not based upon exposure to a hazardous
material or toxic substance.

340.9. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or contract,
any insurance claim for damages arising out of the Northridge
earthquake of 1994 which is barred as of the effective date of this
section solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or
had expired is hereby revived and a cause of action thereon may be
commenced provided that the action is commenced within one year of
the effective date of this section. This subdivision shall only apply
to cases in which an insured contacted an insurer or an insurer's
representative prior to January 1, 2000, regarding potential
Northridge earthquake damage.
(b) Any action pursuant to this section commenced prior to, or
within one year from, the effective date of this section shall not be
barred based upon this limitations period.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the
applicable limitations period of an action that is not time barred as
of the effective date of this section.
(d) This section shall not apply to either of the following:
(1) Any claim that has been litigated to finality in any court of
competent jurisdiction prior to the effective date of this section.
(2) Any written compromised settlement agreement which has been
made between an insurer and its insured where the insured was
represented by counsel admitted to the practice of law in California
at the time of the settlement, and who signed the agreement.

340.10. (a) For purposes of this section, "terrorist victim" means
any individual who died or was injured as a consequence of the
terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, including
persons who were present at the World Trade Center in New York City,
New York, the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, or at the site of the
crash at Shanksville, Pennsylvania, or in the immediate aftermath of
the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001,
including members of the flight crew and passengers on American
Airlines Flight 11, American Airlines Flight 77, United Airlines
Flight 175, and United Airlines Flight 93, and who suffered physical
harm or death as a result of any of the crashes, as defined in
Section 40101 of Title 49 of the United States Code and the related,
applicable regulations, other than an individual identified by the
Attorney General of the United States as a participant or conspirator
in the terrorist-related aircraft crashes, or a representative or
heir of such an individual.
(b) The statute of limitations for injury or death set forth in
Section 335.1 shall apply to any action brought for injury to, or for
the death of, any terrorist victim described in subdivision (a) and
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, regardless of
whether that action lapsed or was otherwise barred by time under
California law predating the passage of this section and Section
335.1.

341. Within six months:
An action against an officer, or officer de facto:
1. To recover any goods, wares, merchandise, or other property,
seized by any such officer in his official capacity as tax collector,
or to recover the price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise,
or other personal property so seized, or for damages for the seizure,
detention, sale of, or injury to any goods, wares, merchandise, or
other personal property seized, or for damages done to any person or
property in making any such seizure.
2. To recover stock sold for a delinquent assessment, as provided
in section three hundred forty-seven of the Civil Code.
3. To set aside or invalidate any action taken or performed by a
majority of the trustees of any corporation heretofore or hereafter
dissolved by operation of law, including the revivor of any such
corporation.

341.5. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any action or
proceeding in which a county, city, city and county, school district,
special district, or any other local agency is a plaintiff or
petitioner, that is brought against the State of California
challenging the constitutionality of any statute relating to state
funding for counties, cities, cities and counties, school districts,
special districts, or other local agencies, shall be commenced within
90 days of the effective date of the statute at issue in the action.
For purposes of this section, "State of California" means the State
of California itself, or any of its agencies, departments,
commissions, boards, or public officials.

341a. All civil actions for the recovery or conversion of personal
property, wearing apparel, trunks, valises or baggage alleged to have
been left at a hotel, hospital, rest home, sanitarium, boarding
house, lodging house, furnished apartment house, or furnished
bungalow court, shall be begun within 90 days from and after the date
of the departure of the owner of said personal property, wearing
apparel, trunks, valises or baggage from said hotel, hospital, rest
home, sanitarium, boarding house, lodging house, furnished apartment
house, or furnished bungalow court.

342. An action against a public entity upon a cause of action for
which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter
1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with
Section 910) of Part 3 of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government
Code must be commenced within the time provided in Section 945.6 of
the Government Code.

343. An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have
accrued.

344. In an action brought to recover a balance due upon a mutual,
open, and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands
between the parties, the cause of action is deemed to have accrued
from the time of the last item proved in the account on either side.

345. The limitations prescribed in this chapter apply to actions
brought in the name of the state or county or for the benefit of the
state or county, in the same manner as to actions by private parties.
Accounts for the support of patients at state or county hospitals
are book accounts as defined in Section 337a, and actions on them may
be commenced at any time within four years after the last date of
service or the last date of payment.

346. An action to redeem a mortgage of real property, with or
without an account of rents and profits, may be brought by the
mortgagor or those claiming under him, against the mortgagee in
possession, or those claiming under him, unless he or they have
continuously maintained an adverse possession of the mortgaged
premises for five years after breach of some condition of the
mortgage.

347. If there is more than one such mortgagor, or more than one
person claiming under a mortgagor, some of whom are not entitled to
maintain such an action under the provisions of this Chapter, any one
of them who is entitled to maintain such an action may redeem
therein a divided or undivided part of the mortgaged premises,
according as his interest may appear and have an accounting, for a
part of the rents and profits proportionate to his interest in the
mortgaged premises, on payment of a part of the mortgage money,
bearing the same proportion to the whole of such money as the value
of his divided or undivided interest in the premises bears to the
whole of such premises.

348. To actions brought to recover money or other property
deposited with any bank, banker, trust company, building and loan
association, or savings and loan society or evidenced by a
certificate issued by an industrial loan company or credit union
there is no limitation.
This section shall not apply to banks, bankers, trust companies,
building and loan associations, industrial loan companies, credit
unions, and savings and loan societies which have become insolvent
and are in process of liquidation and in such cases the statute of
limitations shall be deemed to have commenced to run from the
beginning of the process of liquidation; provided, however, nothing
herein contained shall be construed so as to relieve any stockholder
of any banking corporation or trust company from stockholders'
liability as shall at any time, be provided by law.

348.5. An action upon any bonds or coupons issued by the State of
California shall have no limitation.

349