Sec. 31-290a. Discharge or discrimination prohibited. Right of action. - Connecticut Statutes

      Sec. 31-290a. Discharge or discrimination prohibited. Right of action. (a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.

      (b) Any employee who is so discharged or discriminated against may either: (1) Bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where the employer has its principal office for the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if he had not been discriminated against or discharged and any other damages caused by such discrimination or discharge. The court may also award punitive damages. Any employee who prevails in such a civil action shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs to be taxed by the court; or (2) file a complaint with the chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission alleging violation of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. Upon receipt of any such complaint, the chairman shall select a commissioner to hear the complaint, provided any commissioner who has previously rendered any decision concerning the claim shall be excluded. The hearing shall be held in the workers' compensation district where the employer has its principal office. After the hearing, the commissioner shall send each party a written copy of his decision. The commissioner may award the employee the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he otherwise would have been eligible if he had not been discriminated against or discharged. Any employee who prevails in such a complaint shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees. Any party aggrieved by the decision of the commissioner may appeal the decision to the Appellate Court.

      (P.A. 84-300, S. 1, 2.)

      Cited. 216 C. 40. Cited. 219 C. 1. Cited. 221 C. 356. Cited. 226 C. 475. Employer does not violate this Sec. when it discharges employee solely on the basis that employee, who claims a continued inability to work, fails to return to work following a compensable injury despite having been cleared to do so by his or her treating physician. 258 C. 724. Plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of employment discrimination under statute by failing to present sufficient evidence that she had exercised any rights afforded to her under the act and by lack of evidence in the record to support workers' compensation commissioner's finding that the principal or vice principal knew that plaintiff was exercising her rights or that they intended to discriminate against her for exercising her rights. 270 C. 751.

      Cited. 24 CA 362. Cited. 28 CA 660. Cited. 33 CA 490. Cited. 34 CA 708. Cited. 40 CA 577. Cited. 43 CA 1. Reaffirmed prior rulings that plaintiff has burden of proving discrimination by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 52 CA 570. Where plaintiff offered no evidence to raise an inference of discrimination and failed to present a genuine issue of material fact as to the reason for termination, trial court properly found that a trier of fact could not find discriminatory intent as required under the statute. 64 CA 263. Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence that there was a causal connection between the exercise of his right to workers' compensation benefits and the termination of his employment. Statute does not create liability for all torts and does not create a statutory basis for the abrogation of governmental immunity as to other torts. 108 CA 710.

      Subsec. (a):

      Section contains no requirement that any particular word be used in terminating an employee's employment. Standard for proof of a retaliatory discharge. 49 CA 66.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 219 C. 314. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 91. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.

      Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 116. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by consent and therefore a stipulation between plaintiff and defendant cannot deprive commissioner of jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim. 49 CA 114.