Sec. 53a-13. Lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect as affirmative defense. - Connecticut Statutes

      Sec. 53a-13. Lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect as affirmative defense. (a) In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time he committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.

      (b) It shall not be a defense under this section if such mental disease or defect was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating liquor or any drug or substance, or any combination thereof, unless such drug was prescribed for the defendant by a prescribing practitioner, as defined in subdivision (22) of section 20-571, and was used in accordance with the directions of such prescription.

      (c) As used in this section, the terms mental disease or defect do not include (1) an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct or (2) pathological or compulsive gambling.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 13; P.A. 79-49; P.A. 81-301, S. 1; P.A. 83-486, S. 1; P.A. 95-264, S. 64.)

      History: P.A. 79-49 clarified section by adding provisions concerning effect of use of drugs, intoxicating liquors or combinations of them on defense plea; P.A. 81-301 replaced the provision that "it shall be a defense that the defendant" lacked substantial capacity with "a defendant may be found guilty but not criminally responsible if" he lacked substantial capacity due to mental disease or defect, and replaced "It shall not be a defense under this section" with "A finding of criminal responsibility shall not be barred"; P.A. 83-486 divided section into Subsecs., amended Subsec. (a) by replacing "a defendant my be found guilty but not criminally responsible if" with "it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant", and rephrasing parts of said Subsec., amended Subsec. (b) by replacing "A finding of criminal responsibility shall not be barred" with "It shall not be a defense under this section" and amended Subsec. (c) by providing that mental disease or defect does not include "pathological or compulsive gambling"; P.A. 95-264 amended Subsec. (b) to change "licensed" practitioner to "prescribing" practitioner and referenced the definition section (Revisor's note: The reference in Subsec. (b) to "prescribing practitioner, as defined in subdivision (21) of ..." was corrected editorially by the Revisors to "prescribing practitioner, as defined in subdivision (22) of ...").

      See Sec. 54-89a re court instructions to jury.

      Annotations to former section 54-82a:

      Prior to adoption of statute: Degree of incapacity to render person criminally irresponsible. 39 C. 591; 87 C. 5. Statute adopted test of insanity in model penal code. 157 C. 209, 212. State may in first instance rely on presumption that defendant was sane at time of offense. 158 C. 341. The common law standard of insanity is applicable in a case in which the verdict and judgment was rendered five months prior to the effective date of section 54-82a. 159 C. 385.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 169 C. 13. Trial court did not err in concluding that the evidence was inadequate to raise the reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity necessary to warrant submitting the issue to the jury. 173 C. 35. Once substantial evidence tending to prove insanity is introduced, the presumption that the defendant was sane loses all operative effect. Id., 140. Whether a defendant has put his sanity in issue is a question of law, and once the sanity of the defendant has become an issue the state has the burden of proving the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt. 175 C. 204. Cited. 176 C. 224. State's affirmative evidence was sufficient to support conclusion that state had established sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 178 C. 480. Contains only standard to determine insanity; previously accepted common law definitions and the "Durham" rule included in court instructions constituted harmful error. Id., 626. A defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under this section is before jury. Id., 704. Cited. 182 C. 142; Id., 603. Cited. 185 C. 402. Cited. 187 C. 73; Id., 199. Cited. 189 C. 360. Cited. 191 C. 73; Id., 636. Cited. 192 C. 571. Cited. 193 C. 70; Id., 474. Cited. 196 C. 430. Cited. 198 C. 53; Id., 77; Id., 124; Id., 314; Id., 386; Id., 598. Cited. 200 C. 607. Cited. 201 C. 190; Id., 211. Cited. 202 C. 86. Cited. 203 C. 212. Cited. 206 C. 229. Cited. 208 C. 125. Cited. 209 C. 75; Id., 416. Cited. 211 C. 151; Id., 591. Cited. 218 C. 151; Id., 349; Id., 766. Cited. 225 C. 114; Id., 450. Cited. 227 C. 448; Id., 456. Cited. 228 C. 281. Cited. 229 C. 328. Cited. 230 C. 183; Id., 400. Cited. 234 C. 139. Cited. 242 C. 605. Defendant entitled to an instruction defining "wrongfulness" in terms of societal morality when, in light of the evidence, the distinction between illegality and societal morality bears upon defendant's insanity claim. 254 C. 88.

      The inclusion in the court's charge of language concerning the defendant's capacity to distinguish right from wrong, which involved the abandoned M'Naghten test, was error. 1 CA 697. Cited. 8 CA 307. Cited. 10 CA 302. Cited. 12 CA 32. Cited. 14 CA 511. Cited. 20 CA 342. Cited. 22 CA 669. Cited. 46 CA 486; Id., 734.

      State does not have to produce expert witnesses in order to sustain a conviction against a claim of insanity but may rely upon all the evidence in the case to carry its burden. 33 CS 704.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 201 C. 174. Does not violate due process prohibition against relieving state of its burden of proving every element of crime beyond a reasonable doubt; court finds no constitutional requirement that sanity be considered an essential element of crime to be proved by state. 225 C. 450. Cited. 236 C. 189.

      Cited. 35 CA 94; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185. Cited. 44 CA 70. Defendant not entitled to a jury instruction that distinguishes between legal and societal standards of wrongfulness if defendant fails to present any evidence that, at the time of the killing, he was aware that his actions were illegal but believed that they did not offend societal morality. 50 CA 312.

      Subsec. (b):

      Court's failure to define proximate cause as it related to this subsec. did not constitute a manifest injustice to defendant that impaired the effectiveness or integrity of the trial so as to warrant plain error review. 62 CA 256.