Sec. 53a-8. Criminal liability for acts of another. - Connecticut Statutes

      Sec. 53a-8. Criminal liability for acts of another. (a) A person, acting with the mental state required for commission of an offense, who solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.

      (b) A person who sells, delivers or provides any firearm, as defined in subdivision (19) of section 53a-3, to another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense knowing or under circumstances in which he should know that such other person intends to use such firearm in such conduct shall be criminally liable for such conduct and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 8; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-2.)

      History: 1971 act specified that person who requests, commands, aids, etc. another in the commission of an offense "may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender"; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-2 added Subsec. (b) re criminal liability for the conduct of another person with a firearm.

      Annotations to former section 54-196:

      Cited. 34 C. 131. How accessory may be indicted. 47 C. 119. Cited. 48 C. 95. Does not apply to purchase of liquors sold contrary to law. 50 C. 102. One on whom an abortion is committed is not an accessory. 76 C. 342. All participants in crime are liable as principals. 80 C. 318; 97 C. 332. Information against; may be charged as principal; woman abetting carnal abuse of child. 82 C. 213. Effect of lack of conviction of principal; if he has been convicted, record proves crime. 88 C. 164. Corroboration of testimony of; 75 C. 326; 84 C. 411; 97 C. 471; 105 C. 333; 108 C. 54; commenting on weight of, to jury. 72 C. 321; 76 C. 342; 84 C. 152. Accessory after the fact not included. 92 C. 73. Charge held erroneous in failing to distinguish between mere presence and participation. 96 C. 425. Confession of one held not to require separate trials for other participants. 97 C. 324. Count charging two as principals may be joined with count charging one as principal and the other as accessory; proof that accused is accessory before the fact will support charge that he is a principal; court's refusal to compel state to elect held no error. 98 C. 461. Any person who aids and assists in the commission of a crime is a principal. 99 C. 109. Application where defense is that crime was committed by accused's partner. 102 C. 637. Applies to all crimes, even though statutory crime provides a special definition of accessory. 103 C. 140. Accessory defined; charge held too favorable to accused. 105 C. 757. Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction of accomplice of first degree murder; 106 C. 701; of arson. 109 C. 403. Where state claims accused employed W to set fire, accused not entitled to narrow instruction that W must be proved his agent. 110 C. 63. Accessory may be charged with having actually committed the offense as principal, or he may be charged as an accessory as for a substantive offense. 113 C. 767. Cited. 114 C. 573. Rule stated concerning the responsibility of those conspiring to commit an unlawful act, for a homicide by one of them in carrying it out. 126 C. 59; 132 C. 45. Statute applies to physician prescribing contraceptives. Id., 413; 129 C. 84. See 85 S. Ct. 1678, infra. Cited. 126 C. 429. One may be an accessory even though not present actively aiding, abetting or being guilty of a positive act in the commission of an offense. 147 C. 7. Cited. Id., 48, 633; 148 C. 459; 149 C. 23, 25. Conviction of executive director and medical director of planned parenthood center as accessories in violation of Sec. 53-32 upheld. 151 C. 544. Providing information and advice re preventing conception and furnishing contraceptive devices to married women constituted offense. Id. But conviction reversed due to finding of unconstitutionality of Sec. 53-32. 85 S. Ct. 1678. Cited. 153 C. 555. Jury could reasonably have found defendant a principal offender hereunder in an aggravated assault by his son on a police officer when defendant transported his son and two other men to scene of dispute over a traffic violation, refused to show his car license and struggled with two arresting officers. 155 C. 531. Circumstantial evidence may support jury's conclusion defendant confederated to commit a crime. 158 C. 124. Evidence of assistance by defendant in committing other criminal acts against victim of assault with which defendant is charged. Admissible in court's discretion as admission by conduct. 159 C. 169. As state's evidence showed defendants were in danger of being convicted of capital offense, bail could be denied under section 8 of Article I of state constitution. Id., 285.

      Cited. 26 CS 235.

      Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 553. Mere presence of defendant as an inactive companion would not make him an accessory. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 137.

      Annotations to present section:

      Passive acquiescence or doing of innocent acts which in fact aid in commission of crime, is insufficient to support conviction under accessory statute. 169 C. 581. To establish guilt of accused as accessory under this section governing criminal liability for conduct of another, state must prove criminality of intent and community of unlawful purpose. 170 C. 332. Cited. Id., 417. Cited. 172 C. 322. Cited. 174 C. 500. Cited. 175 C. 155. Cited. 176 C. 131. Propriety of a charge on aiding and abetting predicated on sufficiency of evidence heard during trial. Id., 508. Cited. 177 C. 140. Cited. 178 C. 163; Id., 689. Cited. 179 C. 1. Jury instruction an intent under statute discussed. 182 C. 366. Cited. Id., 501. Cited. 184 C. 369. Cited. 185 C. 163; Id., 260. Cited. 187 C. 513. Cited. 188 C. 432; Id., 542. Cited. 189 C. 337; Id., 383. Cited. 190 C. 822. Cited. 191 C. 27; Id., 659. Cited. 192 C. 383. Cited. 194 C. 96; Id., 198. Cited. 195 C. 128; Id., 598. Cited. 196 C. 225. Cited. 197 C. 436. Cited. 198 C. 158; Id., 255; Id., 328. Cited. 199 C. 14; Id., 473; Id., 591; Id., 693. Cited. 200 C. 9; Id., 523; Id., 685. Cited. 201 C. 125; Id., 289; Id., 395; Id., 489. Cited. 202 C. 520; Id., 615. Cited. 203 C. 420. Cited. 204 C. 240; Id., 630. Cited. 207 C. 323. Cited. 208 C. 38. Cited. 209 C. 75; Id., 290; Id., 458. Cited. 210 C. 435. Cited. 211 C. 1; Id., 289; Id., 398. Cited. 212 C. 593. Cited. 213 C. 708. Cited. 214 C. 122; Id., 344; Id., 454. Cited. 215 C. 570; Id., 716; Id., 739. Cited. 216 C. 367; Id., 492. Cited. 217 C. 243. Cited. 219 C. 596. Cited. 220 C. 270. Cited. 221 C. 430; Id., 925. Cited. 222 C. 469. Cited. 223 C. 243; Id., 384; Id., 595; Id., 703. Cited. 225 C. 270; Id., 347. Cited. 227 C. 32; Id., 207; Id., 231. Cited. 228 C. 582; Id., 918. Cited. 230 C. 351; Id., 608; Id., 686; Id., 698. Cited. 231 C. 545. Cited. 232 C. 455. Cited. 233 C. 304. Cited. 234 C. 683. Cited. 235 C. 402; Id., 473; Id., 748. Cited. 236 C. 514. Cited. 237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 784. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. 240 C. 395; Id., 727. Cited. 241 C. 1; Id., 322; Id., 502; Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 125; Id., 211; Id., 409. Cited. Id., 666. Conviction under section requires state to prove defendant's dual intent first that accessory have the intent to aid the principal and second that in so aiding he intends to commit offense with which he is charged. 252 C. 714. Principles of accessorial liability may be used to prove aggravating factors in penalty phase of a capital case. 271 C. 338.

      Cited. 4 CA 676. Cited. 7 CA 503; Id., 701. Cited. 9 CA 161; Id., 228. Cited. 11 CA 575; Id., 621; Id., 699; Id., 805. Cited. 12 CA 1. Being an accessory to breach of the peace is a cognizable crime. Id., 74. Cited. Id., 343. Cited. 13 CA 76; Id., 554. Cited. 14 CA 1; Id., 205; Id., 445; Id., 472; Id., 493. Cited. 15 CA 122; Id., 416. Cited. 16 CA 89; Id., 333; Id., 455. Cited. 17 CA 50. Cited. 18 CA 175; Id., 184; Id., 730. Cited. 19 CA 179. Cited. 20 CA 410; Id., 665. Cited. 22 CA 216; Id., 329; Id., 340. Cited. 23 CA 123. Cited. 25 CA 318; Id., 565; Id., 646. Cited. 26 CA 33; Id., 641; Id., 779. Cited. 27 CA 1; Id., 558. Cited. 28 CA 126; Id., 306; Id., 474; Id., 575; Id., 721. Cited. 29 CA 59; Id., 304; Id., 499. Cited. 30 CA 190; Id., 232. Cited. 31 CA 47; Id., 614. Cited. 32 CA 224; Id., 831. Cited. 33 CA 143; Id., 288. Cited. 34 CA 223; Id., 717, see 37 CA 509. Cited. 35 CA 138; Id., 360; Id., 527; Id., 781. Cited. 36 CA 190; Id., 454; Id., 473; Id., 753; Id., 774. Cited. 37 CA 35; Id., 40; Id., 276; Id., 509; Id., 574. Cited. 38 CA 777. Cited. 39 CA 224; Id., 242; Id., 579. Cited. 40 CA 47; Id., 470; Id., 526; Id., 789. Cited. 41 CA 47; Id., 565. Cited. 42 CA 555. Cited. 44 CA 499; Id., 790. Cited. 45 CA 270. Cited. 46 CA 269; Id., 640; Id., 778. Statute does not provide for a separate, substantive offense but provides alternate means by which the underlying substantive crime may be committed. 49 CA 121. Fact that defendant not formally charged as accessory does not preclude a conviction as such. Id., 183. State must prove that accused shared both the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with principal perpetrator of the crime. 63 CA 466. Court's charge re accessorial liability properly tracks language of section and correctly explained that acting as accessory merely is an alternative means of committing the substantive offense. 81 CA 152. When defendant is charged with manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory, state must prove that defendant intended to inflict serious physical injury and to aid the principal in doing so, but does not have to also prove that defendant intended the use, carrying or threatened use of the firearm. 95 CA 362. There is no meaningful distinction between principal and accessory liability and defendant may be convicted as accessory even if charged as a principal. 105 CA 862. Evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to establish intent and defendant's identity with respect to charges stemming from drug transaction. 110 CA 70.

      Defendant who operated boat while brother stole lobsters was criminally liable for intentionally aiding brother in the conduct that constituted the liable for intentionally aiding brother in the conduct that constituted the offense. 37 CS 809. Cited. 38 CS 301. Cited. 40 CS 38.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 242 C. 485. Jury did not have to find that defendant actually wielded knife during robbery. It had to find that defendant was a participant in the robbery. 275 C. 534. Trial court properly rejected defendant's claim that a defense of duress, if credited, would negate the required mental state governing accessorial liability, specific intent and duress can coexist. 282 C. 281.

      Cited. 37 CA 464. Cited. 39 CA 333. To be guilty as accessory one must share the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with perpetrator of the crime and must knowingly and willfully assist perpetrator in the acts which prepare for, facilitate or consummate it. 77 CA 80.