Sec. 53a-112. Arson in the second degree: Class B felony. - Connecticut Statutes

      Sec. 53a-112. Arson in the second degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, (1) he starts a fire or causes an explosion and (A) such act subjects another person to a substantial risk of bodily injury; or (B) such fire or explosion was intended to conceal some other criminal act; or (C) such fire or explosion was intended to subject another person to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States; or (2) a fire or explosion was caused by an individual hired by such person to start such fire or cause such explosion.

      (b) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 114; P.A. 79-570, S. 4; P.A. 80-229, S. 2; P.A. 82-290, S. 2; P.A. 84-4.)

      History: P.A. 79-570 made second degree arson a Class B, rather than a Class C felony; P.A. 80-229 added reference to building definition of Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting (1) intent to destroy or damage a building of another (2) fires or explosions caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds and (3) subjecting another building to risk of destruction or damage and adding (1) fires or explosions intended to conceal some criminal act and (2) fires or explosions caused by person hired to set fire or cause explosion; P.A. 84-4 added Subsec. (a)(1)(C) re a fire or explosion intended to subject another person to a deprivation of certain rights, privileges or immunities.

      See also annotations to part V.

      Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 178 C. 67. Cited. 189 C. 228. Cited. 191 C. 636. Cited. 194 C. 617. Cited. 195 C. 600. "... more reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended arsonists to be held culpable (under the statute) for creating substantial risk to other buildings, regardless of how close such risks come to being fulfilled." 197 C. 158. Cited. 198 C. 92. Cited. 199 C. 389. Cited. 204 C. 769. Cited. 219 C. 605. Cited. 236 C. 375.

      Term "another person" includes firefighters. 8 CA 581. Cited. 17 CA 466.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 174 C. 73. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 189 C. 201. Subdiv. (1)(B)(2) cited. Id., 752. Subdiv. (1) (B) cited. 195 C. 128. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 598. Cited. 199 C. 14. Subdiv. (1) cited. 202 C. 93. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 215 C. 716.

      Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA 422. Cited. 28 CA 9. Subdiv. (2): Holding in State v. Schleifer, that solicitation of another to set a fire was insufficient to establish the crime of attempt to commit arson, has been legislatively overruled by enactment of P.A. 82-290. 59 CA 362.