Sec. 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. - Connecticut Statutes

      Sec. 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, (2) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or (3) such person threatens to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.

      (b) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 63; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 8, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 16.)

      History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing "threatening" with "threatening in the second degree" where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, delete Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and delete Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience, said provisions being reenacted as part of Sec. 53a-61aa by same act, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re a person, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person and add Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.

      Cited. 175 C. 204. Cited. 182 C. 585; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1. Cited. 193 C. 602. Cited. 195 C. 636. Cited. 201 C. 115. Cited. 202 C. 343. Cited. 205 C. 262. Cited. 207 C. 565. Cited. 208 C. 689. Cited. 209 C. 34; Id., 52. Cited. 222 C. 331. Cited. 224 C. 494. Cited. 227 C. 829. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 648.

      Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 289. Cited. 8 CA 190; Id., 496. Cited. 9 CA 161. Cited. 14 CA 6; Id., 526. Cited. 25 CA 149; Id., 334. Cited. 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494. Cited. 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; Id., 708. Cited. 31 CA 497. Cited. 33 CA 103. Cited. 40 CA 805. Cited. 41 CA 47. Words of defendant's threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of "imminent" serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489.

      Cited. 37 CS 664. Cited. 42 CS 574. Cited. 43 CS 46.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 566; 197 C. 485; 201 C. 462. Cited. 226 C. 601. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28 CA 581, reversed. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 153; 228 C. 147; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 403.

      Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 80; 13 CA 386; Id., 438; 18 CA 643; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; 35 CA 262; 37 CA 276; Id., 733; 38 CA 306. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777; 39 CA 617; 40 CA 515; 41 CA 584. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 701. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Statute's application to defendant's conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case. 81 CA 248. There is no indication that legislature did not intend to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181 (a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). Id.