Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony. - Connecticut Statutes

      Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B) to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or (2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of a government function.

      (b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)

      History: P.A. 73-137 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) making kidnapping a first degree offense when abducted person dies during abduction or before his return to safety and provisions in that Subsec. re circumstances which determine the presumption of death and provisions in Subsec. (b) re imposition of death penalty and re sentence for Class A felony when accused enters guilty plea and court and state's attorney consent; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to insert Subpara. indicators and made other technical changes.

      Cited. 173 C. 165. Cited. 197 C. 436; Id., 588. Cited. 198 C. 671. Cited. 200 C. 268. Cited. 201 C. 276. Cited. 211 C. 672. Cited. 212 C. 31. Cited. 225 C. 347. Cited. 227 C. 677. Cited. 235 C. 711. Cited. 236 C. 112.

      Cited. 24 CA 13. Cited. 39 CA 632. Cited. 46 CA 691; Id., 741.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended. 173 C. 165. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 185 C. 339. Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 346. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 194 C. 114; Id., 692. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 197 C. 588. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 198 C. 147; Id., 285; Id., 405; 199 C. 399; 200 C. 586; 201 C. 517; Id., 559; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; 203 C. 385. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 204 C. 1. Cited. Id., 240. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 714. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 205 C. 132. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 673. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 206 C. 40; 209 C. 416; Id., 733; 210 C. 110. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 199. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 315. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18; 213 C. 388. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 422. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 214 C. 38; Id., 89; 215 C. 173; Id., 716; 216 C. 647; 217 C. 243. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; 219 C. 93. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 160. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; Id., 269. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 283. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 489. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id; 220 C. 270. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 345. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 487. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 698; 221 C. 264; 222 C. 556; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 450; Id., 519. Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 618. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 227 C. 1. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 153; 228 C. 582; 229 C. 557; 231 C. 195. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 403. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 235 C. 145. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 694; 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent liberation. 262 C. 179. The legislature intended to exclude from the scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against that victim. 287 C. 509. Subdiv. (2)(A): Since there was no evidence that defendant restrained victim to any greater degree than that necessary to commit the sexual assault, his conviction of kidnapping in the first degree cannot stand. Id., 608.

      Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 8 CA 177. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 25 CA 428. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 28 CA 195; 33 CA 457. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 34 CA 276; 36 CA 190; Id., 216; Id., 641; Id., 718. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 774. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 37 CA 360. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 464; 38 CA 777. Cited. 39 CA 579. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 41 CA 317; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445; 43 CA 715. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 44 CA 307; 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under section. 55 CA 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 CA 320. Kidnapping in the first degree statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of defendant's case. 91 CA 47. Abduction requirement under kidnapping statute was satisfied by testimony showing that defendant, in an effort to prevent victim from leaving his apartment, took her by the leg and placed his arm around her neck in a headlock and thereby restricted her movement with the intent to prevent her liberation. 96 CA 155.

      Cited. 43 CS 46.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 8 CA 177.