213.111. 1. If, after one hundred eighty days from the filing of acomplaint alleging an unlawful discriminatory practice pursuant to section213.055, 213.065 or 213.070 to the extent that the alleged violation ofsection 213.070 relates to or involves a violation of section 213.055 or213.065, or subdivision (3) of section 213.070 as it relates to employmentand public accommodations, the commission has not completed itsadministrative processing and the person aggrieved so requests in writing,the commission shall issue to the person claiming to be aggrieved a letterindicating his or her right to bring a civil action within ninety days ofsuch notice against the respondent named in the complaint. If, after thefiling of a complaint pursuant to sections 213.040, 213.045, 213.050 and213.070, to the extent that the alleged violation of section 213.070relates to or involves a violation of sections 213.040, 213.045 and213.050, or subdivision (3) of section 213.070 as it relates to housing,and the person aggrieved so requests in writing, the commission shall issueto the person claiming to be aggrieved a letter indicating his or her rightto bring a civil action within ninety days of such notice against therespondent named in the complaint. Such an action may be brought in anycircuit court in any county in which the unlawful discriminatory practiceis alleged to have occurred, either before a circuit or associate circuitjudge. Upon issuance of this notice, the commission shall terminate allproceedings relating to the complaint. No person may file or reinstate acomplaint with the commission after the issuance of a notice under thissection relating to the same practice or act. Any action brought in courtunder this section shall be filed within ninety days from the date of thecommission's notification letter to the individual but no later than twoyears after the alleged cause occurred or its reasonable discovery by thealleged injured party.
2. The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, anypermanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or otherorder, and may award to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages, and mayaward court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party,other than a state agency or commission or a local commission; except that,a prevailing respondent may be awarded court costs and reasonable attorneyfees only upon a showing that the case is without foundation.
(L. 1986 S.B. 513 ยง 213.110, A.L. 1992 H.B. 1619, A.L. 1998 S.B. 786, A.L. 1999 H.B. 741)(1998) Right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but is a condition precedent to bringing an action under MHRA. Whitmore v. O'Connor Management, Inc., 156 F.3d 796 (8th Cir.).
(1999) Statute is insufficiently explicit to overcome presumption against punitive damages when a municipality is the defendant. Kline v. City of Kansas City, 175 F.3d 660 (8th Cir.).
(2003) Civil action for damages only is neither equitable nor administrative in nature and thus is entitled to be tried by jury. State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82 (Mo.banc).