287.490. Final award conclusive unless an appeal is taken--grounds for setting aside--disputes governed by this section, claims arising before August 13, 1980. - Missouri Statutes

Final award conclusive unless an appeal is taken--grounds for settingaside--disputes governed by this section, claims arising beforeAugust 13, 1980.

287.490. 1. The final award of the commission shall beconclusive and binding unless either party to the dispute shallwithin thirty days from the date of the final award appeal to thecircuit court of the county in which the accident occurred, or ifthe accident occurred outside of this state, then in the countywhere the contract of employment was made. Such appeal may betaken by filing notice of appeal with the commission, whereuponthe commission shall under its certificate return to the courtall documents and papers on file in the matter, together with atranscript of the evidence, the findings and award, which shallthereupon become the record of the cause. Upon appeal noadditional evidence shall be heard and in the absence of fraud,the findings of fact made by the commission within its powersshall be conclusive and binding. The court, on appeal, shallreview only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand forrehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the followinggrounds and no other:

(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of itspowers;

(2) That the award was procured by fraud;

(3) That the facts found by the commission do not supportthe award;

(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in therecord to warrant the making of the award.

2. Appeals from the circuit court shall be allowed in thesame manner as in civil actions, except that the originaltranscript prepared and filed in the circuit court by thecommission, together with a transcript of the proceedings had inthe circuit court, shall constitute the transcript on appeal inthe appellate court. The commission shall make available, to theparties, copies of any transcript prepared and filed by it in thecircuit court and upon final determination of the cause in theappellate court the original record of the commission filed as apart of the transcript on appeal shall be certified back to thecommission by the appellate court. In all appeals from thecommission or circuit court the costs thereof shall be assessedagainst the losing party as provided by law in civil cases. Allappeals to the circuit and appellate courts shall have precedenceover all cases except election contests.

3. The provisions of this section shall only apply todisputes based on claims which arose prior to August 13, 1980.All disputes based on claims arising on or after August 13, 1980,shall be governed by the provisions of section 287.495.

(RSMo 1939 § 3732, A.L. 1955 p. 598, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396)

Prior revision: 1929 § 3342

(1960) Where commission affirmed award of referee that claimant had not sustained accidental injury and claimant appealed to circuit court and procured the judgment he sought, namely remand of the claim with directions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction because of no accident, the employer and insurer were thereby "aggrieved" within meaning of § 512.020 but on the record the appellate court would not review question of whether an accident existed. Harger v. Acme Fast Freight Inc. (Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 109.

(1963) Industrial commission was not required to set out specific findings of facts as to each individual injury and the resultant percent of disability attributed to each, and ultimate findings of commission that claimant sustained 40% permanent partial disability to body as a whole was sufficient and award was properly based thereon. Carenza v. Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. (A.), 368 S.W.2d 507.

(1963) Workmen's compensation commission had implied authority to enter order vacating award prior to expiration of thirty-day appeal period. Fisher v. City of Independence (Mo.), 370 S.W.2d 310.

(1963) Commission's finding that janitor's activity amounted to "an unusual or abnormal strain" which constituted an accident because he exerted himself beyond his usual routine in clearing snow from extensive area of employer's sidewalk was a legal conclusion and, therefore, award was subject to review. Flippin v. First National Bank of Joplin (A.), 372 S.W.2d 273.

(1965) Finding of fact held sufficient to sustain order denying compensation. Dixon v. Art Bunker Motors, Inc. (A.), 387 S.W.2d 199.

(1965) In workmen's compensation case the reviewing court cannot substitute its own judgment on the evidence for that of the industrial commission, but is empowered to determine whether the award of the commission is supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Jacobs v. Eldridge Construction Co. (A.), 393 S.W.2d 33.

(1967) Decisions of the industrial commission which are clearly the interpretation or application of law, rather than a determination of facts, are not binding upon appeals court. Saxton v. St. Louis Stair Company (A.), 410 S.W.2d 369.

(1967) Where there is no material conflict in, or dispute concerning, the facts bearing upon a claimant's status as an employee vel non, the resolution of that issue becomes a question of law and the industrial commission's determination is not binding on the reviewing court. Lawson v. Lawson (A.), 415 S.W.2d 313.

(1969) Decisions of the industrial commission which are clearly the interpretations or applications of the law, as distinguished from a determination of facts, are not binding upon the court and are within the province of review and correction. Weilert v. Fruin-Colnon Corp. (A.), 447 S.W.2d 781.

(1970) Notice of Appeal to Industrial Commission affirmation of a Workman's Compensation Award must be received within 30 days. Holmes v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (A.), 488 S.W.2d 311.

(1971) The findings of a referee are not binding on the commission but a reviewing court must affirm an award by the commission if it is supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record thus though the evidence was conflicting and some of claimant's testimony was contradictory, but not to sufficient degree to destroy essential elements of his case, the court affirmed the award. Deatherage v. Churchill Truck Lines, Inc. (A.), 469 S.W.2d 660.

(1975) "Last known address" is that place where mail would be most likely to reach a person, that would be their residence. Failure of commission to send notice of award to residence prevented loss of jurisdiction because of 30 day rule in section 287.490. Cagle v. Regal Plastics Company (A.), 522 S.W.2d 7.

(1980) A circuit court in reviewing the decision of the commission cannot simply agree with a dissenting member of the commission that the evidence was not believable. Johnson v. General Motors Assembly Division G.M.C. (A.), 605 S.W.2d 511.