288.050. Benefits denied unemployed workers, when--pregnancy, requirements for benefit eligibility. - Missouri Statutes

Benefits denied unemployed workers, when--pregnancy, requirements forbenefit eligibility.

288.050. 1. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this law, aclaimant shall be disqualified for waiting week credit or benefits untilafter the claimant has earned wages for work insured pursuant to theunemployment compensation laws of any state equal to ten times theclaimant's weekly benefit amount if the deputy finds:

(1) That the claimant has left work voluntarily without good causeattributable to such work or to the claimant's employer. A temporaryemployee of a temporary help firm will be deemed to have voluntarily quitemployment if the employee does not contact the temporary help firm forreassignment prior to filing for benefits. Failure to contact thetemporary help firm will not be deemed a voluntary quit unless the claimanthas been advised of the obligation to contact the firm upon completion ofassignments and that unemployment benefits may be denied for failure to doso. The claimant shall not be disqualified:

(a) If the deputy finds the claimant quit such work for the purposeof accepting a more remunerative job which the claimant did accept and earnsome wages therein;

(b) If the claimant quit temporary work to return to such claimant'sregular employer; or

(c) If the deputy finds the individual quit work, which would havebeen determined not suitable in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) ofsubdivision (3) of this subsection, within twenty-eight calendar days ofthe first day worked;

(d) As to initial claims filed after December 31, 1988, if theclaimant presents evidence supported by competent medical proof that shewas forced to leave her work because of pregnancy, notified her employer ofsuch necessity as soon as practical under the circumstances, and returnedto that employer and offered her services to that employer as soon as shewas physically able to return to work, as certified by a licensed andpracticing physician, but in no event later than ninety days after thetermination of the pregnancy. An employee shall have been employed for atleast one year with the same employer before she may be provided benefitspursuant to the provisions of this paragraph;

(2) That the claimant has retired pursuant to the terms of a laboragreement between the claimant's employer and a union duly elected by theemployees as their official representative or in accordance with anestablished policy of the claimant's employer; or

(3) That the claimant failed without good cause either to apply foravailable suitable work when so directed by a deputy of the division ordesignated staff of an employment office as defined in subsection 16 ofsection 288.030, or to accept suitable work when offered the claimant,either through the division or directly by an employer by whom theindividual was formerly employed, or to return to the individual'scustomary self-employment, if any, when so directed by the deputy. Anoffer of work shall be rebuttably presumed if an employer notifies theclaimant in writing of such offer by sending an acknowledgment via any formof certified mail issued by the United States Postal Service stating suchoffer to the claimant at the claimant's last known address. Nothing inthis subdivision shall be construed to limit the means by which the deputymay establish that the claimant has or has not been sufficiently notifiedof available work.

(a) In determining whether or not any work is suitable for anindividual, the division shall consider, among other factors and inaddition to those enumerated in paragraph (b) of this subdivision, thedegree of risk involved to the individual's health, safety and morals, theindividual's physical fitness and prior training, the individual'sexperience and prior earnings, the individual's length of unemployment, theindividual's prospects for securing work in the individual's customaryoccupation, the distance of available work from the individual's residenceand the individual's prospect of obtaining local work; except that, if anindividual has moved from the locality in which the individual actuallyresided when such individual was last employed to a place where there isless probability of the individual's employment at such individual's usualtype of work and which is more distant from or otherwise less accessible tothe community in which the individual was last employed, work offered bythe individual's most recent employer if similar to that which suchindividual performed in such individual's last employment and at wages,hours, and working conditions which are substantially similar to thoseprevailing for similar work in such community, or any work which theindividual is capable of performing at the wages prevailing for such workin the locality to which the individual has moved, if not hazardous to suchindividual's health, safety or morals, shall be deemed suitable for theindividual;

(b) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this law, no work shallbe deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied pursuant to this law toany otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under anyof the following conditions:

a. If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike,lockout, or other labor dispute;

b. If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered aresubstantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing forsimilar work in the locality;

c. If as a condition of being employed the individual would berequired to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joiningany bona fide labor organization.

2. If a deputy finds that a claimant has been discharged formisconduct connected with the claimant's work, such claimant shall bedisqualified for waiting week credit and benefits, and no benefits shall bepaid nor shall the cost of any benefits be charged against any employer forany period of employment within the base period until the claimant hasearned wages for work insured under the unemployment laws of this state orany other state as prescribed in this section. In addition to thedisqualification for benefits pursuant to this provision the division mayin the more aggravated cases of misconduct, cancel all or any part of theindividual's wage credits, which were established through the individual'semployment by the employer who discharged such individual, according to theseriousness of the misconduct. A disqualification provided for pursuant tothis subsection shall not apply to any week which occurs after the claimanthas earned wages for work insured pursuant to the unemployment compensationlaws of any state in an amount equal to six times the claimant's weeklybenefit amount. Should a claimant be disqualified on a second orsubsequent occasion within the base period or subsequent to the base periodthe claimant shall be required to earn wages in an amount equal to or inexcess of six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount for eachdisqualification.

3. Absenteeism or tardiness may constitute a rebuttable presumptionof misconduct, regardless of whether the last incident alone constitutesmisconduct, if the discharge was the result of a violation of theemployer's attendance policy, provided the employee had received knowledgeof such policy prior to the occurrence of any absence or tardy upon whichthe discharge is based.

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1 of this section, aclaimant may not be determined to be disqualified for benefits because theclaimant is in training approved pursuant to Section 236 of the Trade Actof 1974, as amended, (19 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2296, as amended), or because theclaimant left work which was not suitable employment to enter suchtraining. For the purposes of this subsection "suitable employment" means,with respect to a worker, work of a substantially equal or higher skilllevel than the worker's past adversely affected employment, and wages forsuch work at not less than eighty percent of the worker's average weeklywage as determined for the purposes of the Trade Act of 1974.

(L. 1951 p. 564, A.L. 1957 p. 531, A.L. 1975 S.B. 325, A.L. 1979 S.B. 477, A.L. 1982 H.B. 1521, A.L. 1984 H.B. 1251 & 1549, A.L. 1988 H.B. 1485, A.L. 1996 H.B. 1368, A.L. 1997 H.B. 472, A.L. 2004 H.B. 1268 & 1211, A.L. 2006 H.B. 1456)

Effective 10-01-06

(1954) Where substantial evidence supported finding that truck driver was discharged for drinking while on duty in violation of employer's rule and union contract, his disqualification for benefits was proper. Ritch v. Industrial Comm. (A.), 271 S.W.2d 791.

(1958) Offer of employment by former employer must be communicated to claimant so that where former employee who moved to new address and so did not receive letter offering him work would not be disqualified for failing to accept such work. ACF Industries v. Industrial Comm. (A.), 309 S.W.2d 676. Overruled (Mo.), 320 S.W.2d 484 (1959) where it was held that since claimant's own neglect or voluntary action prevented communication of offer and effected a breach of his contract, he was ineligible for benefits.

(1959) Word "attributable" as used in the statute as to the cause of leaving work requires a causal connection between the leaving and the work of claimant. Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Mo., 327 S.W.2d 487.

(1960) Claimant who left her work with appellant solely because of pregnancy, and on being ready to return to work approximately two and one-half months after baby's birth, was told there was no work available, was not entitled to unemployment compensation as she had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her or to her employer. Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission (A.), 335 S.W.2d 456.

(1960) Where a moving picture projectionist acted as a substitute for the regular projectionist and worked one day a week for several months and finally ceased working because the regular projectionist decided to work full time, the substitute was deemed to have voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his work or employer since the employer had nothing to do with the arrangement between the regular projectionist and the substitute. Kilgore v Industrial Commission (A.), 337 S.W.2d 91.

(1964) Where claimant, who was granted year's leave of absence due to pregnancy and was at first denied permission to return to work but was later allowed to return to work prior to expiration of leave, filed claim for benefits after having made five applications for work with other employers, commission's decision disqualifying claimant was proper. Neely v. Industrial Comm. of Mo., Div. of Emp. Sec. (A.), 379 S.W.2d 201.

(1973) Even though claimant received compensation at the approximate rate of $3.54 per hour at the time of her termination, her refusal to accept work at anything less than $3.23 per hour when offered $2.50 per hour justified the determination that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits on the grounds she was unavailable for work. Blackman v. Industrial Commission, Div. of Emp. Sec. (A.), 491 S.W.2d 18.

(1976) Termination of employee for refusal to shave beard held not termination because of misconduct connected with work so as to disqualify employee from waiting week credit or benefits as provided in this section, where evidence was that employee had been assured by his immediate supervisor that employer's rule against beards did not apply to him, that employee had worn beard without question of a rule violation for over a year while receiving satisfactory ratings and a wage increase, and that employee had not acted in wanton or willful disregard of his employer's interest. Laswell v. Industrial Com'n. of Missouri, etc. (A.),534 S.W.2d 613.

(1978) Held employee who made fraudulent claims for insurance benefits on divorced wife committed action which constituted "misconduct connected with work" and disqualified him for unemployment compensation. Sain v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (A.), 564 S.W.2d 59.

(1984) Profane language of employer in criticizing employee did not constitute "good cause" for employee to leave his employment, particularly when employee was not called any profane names. Backer's Potato Chip v. Labor and Industrial Relations (Mo.App), 679 S.W.2d 909.

(1985) Claimant who voluntarily left her employment due to pregnancy was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Mo. banc), 688 S.W.2d 344.

(1987) This section has been held consistent with Federal law. Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission of Missouri, 107 S.Ct. 821.

(1987) This statute represents a neutral policy toward the fundamental right to bear children and decision to deny unemployment compensation to women who quit job to have a child pursuant to this statute is lawful. Sokol v. Smith, 671 F.Supp. 1243 (W.D.Mo.).