CHAPTER 6. CULPABILITY GENERALLY - Texas Statutes

PENAL CODE

TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

CHAPTER 6. CULPABILITY GENERALLY

Sec. 6.01. REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARY ACT OR OMISSION. (a) A

person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in

conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession.

(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly

obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his

control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to

terminate his control.

(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an

offense unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the

omission is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty

to perform the act.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 3, eff.

Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 3, Sec. 1, eff. Feb. 25,

1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,

1994.

Sec. 6.02. REQUIREMENT OF CULPABILITY. (a) Except as provided

in Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless he

intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence

engages in conduct as the definition of the offense requires.

(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a

culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless

required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental

element.

(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a

culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless required under

Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to

establish criminal responsibility.

(d) Culpable mental states are classified according to relative

degrees, from highest to lowest, as follows:

(1) intentional;

(2) knowing;

(3) reckless;

(4) criminal negligence.

(e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged

constitutes proof of the culpability charged.

(f) An offense defined by municipal ordinance or by order of a

county commissioners court may not dispense with the requirement

of a culpable mental state if the offense is punishable by a fine

exceeding the amount authorized by Section 12.23.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept.

1, 1994.

Amended by:

Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch.

1219, Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2005.

Sec. 6.03. DEFINITIONS OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES. (a) A person

acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of

his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his

conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause

the result.

(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to

the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his

conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the

circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,

with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his

conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to

circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his

conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist

or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and

degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the

standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all

the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally

negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct

or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist

or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and

degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross

deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would

exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's

standpoint.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept.

1, 1994.

Sec. 6.04. CAUSATION: CONDUCT AND RESULTS. (a) A person is

criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but

for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with

another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient

to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly

insufficient.

(b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing

a result if the only difference between what actually occurred

and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that:

(1) a different offense was committed; or

(2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or

otherwise affected.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept.

1, 1994.